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MINING REGULATION AND TAKINGS
L. Thomas Galloway
I. INTRODUCTION
The field of mining regulation has over the years proved to
be a rich source of "takings" jurisprudence.

Indeed, several of

the seminal takings pronouncements made by the Supreme Court in
this century have involved issues related to mine regulation. See,
e.g.,

Pennsylvania Coal v Mahon,

260 U.S.

393

(1922);

Keystone

Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).

It is

very likely that mining regulation, whether of coal or hardrock
mines, will continue to be a source of "takings" litigation and
ultimately, takings jurisprudence.
It is not the purpose of this paper or my discussion today to
dwell extensively on the existing case law of takings and past
events in the field of mining regulation; rather, this paper will
focus on significant regulatory events in Washington which raise
in one form or the other takings concerns, and which, within due
course,

will

almost

certainly

produce

significant

takings

litigation.
The paper will

first

address various

takings

issues

with

regard to the Senate and House positions on reform of the 1872
Mining Law, and then turn to certain pending issues with regard to
implementation of the Surface Coal Mining Reclamation Act of 1977,
30 U.S.C. 1201 et seq.

II. REFORM OF THE 1872 MINING LAW
As

most

are

aware,

Congress

is

currently

significant reform of the 1872 Mining Law.

considering

Both the House and

Senate have passed legislation to reform the Mining Law, albeit
in radically different ways. The Conference between the two Houses
is expected to begin shortly.
The

two

major

vehicles

consider are the House bill,

which

the

H.R.

322,

Conference

will

likely

and a counter proposal

developed by Chairman Johnston of the Senate Committee on Energy
and Natural Resources, known as the "Chairman's Mark".
bill
would

unquestionably raises numerous possible takings
like

to

address

here

two

of

what

I

consider

While each
issues,
the

I

most

interesting.
During

House

consideration,

the

Clinton

Administration

proposed and the Committee on Natural Resources initially accepted
as Section 422 a procedure to handle claims for just compensation.
(Attached)

Essentially, the Administration proposed to allow the

Secretary of the Interior 120 days to rescind or modify any federal
action that was

found by a court of competent jurisdiction to

constitute a taking within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. The
Secretary's decision to rescind or modify the federal action would
not be subject to judicial review.

The proposal also provided that

to the extent that a court of competent jurisdiction found that any
provision of the Act effected a taking on its face, the Secretary

3
was required to submit a report of the finding to the President,
and within

120

days,

the

President was

required to

submit to

Congress a report describing such action and advising Congress
whether an amendment to the Act was necessary.
Among other notable features, the proposal required any person
alleging a taking to bring such action within two years of the
federal action and delayed payment of any award made by a court for
180 days to allow the Secretary time to make a decision whether to
modify or rescind the federal action involved in the takings claim.
The proposal was ultimately rejected by the Committee based
on objections by environmental organizations that the Secretary
should not be given unfettered authority to lower environmental
standards
standard
applied.

once
has

a

been

court

has

deemed

determined

a taking,

that

either

application

on

its

face

of
or

a
as

Aside from this basic objection, questions arose as to

what environmental standard would apply in such circumstances. For
example, if a permit were denied because of the likelihood that it
would severely degrade or destroy a significant aquifer,

and a

court of competent jurisdiction found this federal action to be a
taking, and the Secretary decided to rescind his action denying the
permit,

what

environmental

standard

would

then

apply

to

the

operation as far as groundwater protection was concerned?
These concerns resulted in the removal of the proposal from
the House bill. However, if the Senate in conference raises takings
concerns as is likely, the proposal or a variant of the proposal
is likely to resurface.

The proposal is important not only in the

4
field

of

mining

regulation,

but

in

the

entire

arena

of

environmental regulation, as the Administration made clear in the
discussions

over the proposal

that they wished to

include the

provision in other environmental or land use statutes.
A second interesting takings issue has arisen with regard to
the age-old question when a compensable right arises as a result
of perfecting a claim under the 1872 Mining Law, and accordingly,
when, if at all, the Secretary can deny the right to mine based on
environmental concerns on federal lands.

H.R. 322 takes what might

be characterized as the traditional approach; it essentially leaves
the

issue

to

adjudication,

and

provides

the

Secretary

authority at various points in the regulatory process,

with

including

at the permitting stage, to bar mining. If the prospective miner
believes that such action constitutes a taking, he or she would be
free to litigate the issue. However, no mining would occur.
Chairman Johnston in the Mark now being considered by the
Senate conferees has chosen a markedly different approach. While
somewhat complex, Chairman Johnston is attempting through statute
to determine when compensable rights vest at various stages in the
regulatory process.
The Mark provides that the right to mine does not become
compensable until
receive

a

"mineral

a

"mineral patent"
patent"

is received.

under the Mark until

a

One cannot
"land use"

decision is made. The "land use" decision must be made within one
year of submittal of a complete exploration permit application.
Under the land use provisions of the Mark, the Secretary can

5
find

lands

unsuitable

for mining

only

if the

proposed

mining

activity would have "a substantial adverse effect on a significant
water resource that cannot be mitigated" or would significantly
degrade the values for which a National Conservation System unit
located in close proximity to the proposed mineral activities (or
within

which

the

established.
prohibited,

mineral

activities

would

be

conducted)

If the Secretary makes either finding,

was

mining is

and at least in the Chairman's view, no compensable

taking would occur.
Conversely,

if the Secretary determines that neither of the

two conditions exist,

the applicant qualifies

for the

"mineral

patent" and a compensable right is created. The patent holder then
proceeds through the mining permit application process, but under
the

Chairman's

Mark,

the

permit

application

cannot

be

denied,

whatever the potential environmental impact of the mine. The Mark
attempts to ameliorate adverse environmental impacts by requiring
the applicant to use the best technology currently available to
mitigate environmental damage, but under no circumstance can the
permit be denied.
This issue will be one of the two or three most vigorously
debated issues

in Conference,

and may well overshadow even the

royalty debate.

III. SURFACE MINING CONTROL AND RECLAMATION ACT OF 1977
While various takings issues have arisen in the sixteen year
effort

to

implement

the

Surface Mining Act,

perhaps

the most

6
perplexing and certainly the most difficult to resolve has been the
definition of valid existing rights. Under Section 522(e) of the
Surface Mining Act, mining is prohibited in certain defined areas,
such as within the National Park System, National Wildlife Refuges,
within

one hundred

feet

of any public

road,

and within

three

hundred feet of occupied dwellings, public schools, churches and
so forth. The prohibition on mining is subject to valid existing
rights or "VER".
The Secretary of the Interior has for over fifteen years been
attempting to define the term, without notable success. Secretary
Andrus restricted VER to persons who had obtained permits to mine
by the date of passage of the Act. This standard was essentially
upheld by the United States District Court which broadened the
standard slightly to

include person who had made

a good

faith

effort to obtain all required permits by the date of passage of the
Act.

("good

faith all

permits test")

While

the

issue was

on

appeal, President Reagan took office, and Secretary Watt withdrew
the regulation, began new rulemaking and ultimately promulgated a
standard that was coterminous with the "takings" test; that is, if
prohibiting mining would constitute a taking, then the person had
VER.

This rule was struck down on procedural grounds.("takings

test") There then ensued various abortive attempts at rulemaking,
none of which produced a final rule.

During the course of the

various attempts at rulemaking, a third alternative appeared- if
a person owned the mineral or otherwise had the right to mine the
mineral by the method the person was proposing, then that person

7
had

VER.

("property

test")

The

Administration

coupled

this

definition with a determination that VER was transferable.
The Clinton Administration has recently announced that

it

plans to tackle the issue once more. It is not an enviable task.
Under

the

good

faith

all

permits

test

favored

by

the

environmentalists, given the sixteen years that have gone by since
the passage of the Act, no one, or almost no one, will have VER.
Conversely,

under

the

property

test

favored

by

the

industry,

everyone or almost everyone will have VER, at least as to privately
owned coal.

Almost all admit that the so-called "middle ground"

takings standard is very difficult for state and federal mining
agencies to administer.
The matter is made the more urgent and important in the field
of mining

regulation

525(e)(5)

prohibition

by

a related

on

mining

issue-

within

whether

three

the

hundred

section
feet

of

occupied dwellings, churches and so forth applies to the surface
effects

of

abortive

underground

litigation

mining,

over

this

i.e.,

subsidence.

issue,

the

After

Solicitor

of

much
the

Department of Interior issued an Opinion finding that it did not.
This Opinion was struck down on procedural grounds by the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia.
If

section

525(e)

is determined

to

apply

to

the

surface

effects of underground mining, the definition of VER will take on
increased

importance,

and

bring

center

stage

whether

such

a

prohibition constitutes a taking. The issue will have particular
impact on the large long wall mining operations in the Eastern

8
United States.
CONCLUSION
This brief outline of a few of the current regulatory issues
which raise takings questions illustrates that mining regulation
is likely to retain its historic role as a major arena for the
determination of the scope of the Fifth Amendment as it applies to
regulatory takings.

15 SEC. 422. CLAIMS FOR JUST COMPENSATION.
16
(a) F ederal Action Implementing This Act.—
17 (1) To the extent a court of competent jurisdiction, after
18 adjudication, finds that Federal action undertaken pursu19 ant to this Act effects a taking under the Fifth Amend20 ment of the United States Constitution and enters a final
21 judgment against the United States awarding just com22 pensation, the Secretary of the Interior, or the Secretary
23 of Agriculture as appropriate, in his or her sole discretion
24 and notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, may
25 rescind or modify such Federal action, in whole or in part,
/

October 22, 1993 (5:33 p.m.)

H.L.C.

127

1 within 120 days after entry of the final judgment. The
2 Secretary' s decision to rescind or modify the Federal ac3 tion shall not be subject to judicial review
4
(2) The United States, as a party in the action, shall
5 advise the court and the opposing party or parties in such
6 litigation of the Secretary’s decision on or before 150 days
7 after entry of the final judgment.
8
(3) Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 2414
9 and 2517 of title 28 of the United States Code, the pay10 ment of any just compensation awarded in litigation de
11 scribed in paragraph (1) of this subsection shall be de12 ferred for no more than 180 days after entry of the final
13 judgment, except that this 180-day limitation on deferral
14 of payment shall not apply if the judgment is reopened
15 as provided in paragraph (4) (A) of this subsection.
16
(4) (A) If the Secretary decides, pursuant to para17 graph (1) of this subsection, to rescind or modify the Fed18 eral action in whole or in part, and on motion of either
19 the United States or the opposing party or parties in the
20 litigation, the court shall reopen the final judgment to de21 termine the extent, if any, to which the Secretary's action
22 affects the finding of any taking, the award of any just
23 compensation, and the award of reasonable fees and ex24 penses to the extent provided by section 304 of the Uni-

October 22,1993 (5:33 p.m.)
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

form Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition
Policies Act of 1970, as amended (42 U.S.C. 4654(c)).
(B) If the Secretary does not timely decide to rescind
or modify the Federal action in whole or in part, the just
compensation award shall include, when paid, appropriate
postjudgment interest for the period of deferred payment,
and appropriate reasonable fees and expenses to the extent
provided by section 304 of the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970
(42 U.S.C. 4554(c)).
(b) Effect of the Terms of This Act.—(1) To
the extent a court of competent jurisdiction finds that the
terms of this Act on its face effect a taking under the
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and
enters a final judgment against the United States awarding just compensation—
(A) the Secretary of the Interior, or the Secretary of Agriculture as appropriate, shall submit to
the President a report describing such decision and
containing recommendations of the Secretary, if any,
for congressional action, including but not limited to,
amendment of this Act; and
(B) no later than 120 days after entry of the
final judgment, the President shall submit to the
Congress a report describing such decision and ad-

October 22,1993 (5:33 p.m.)

H.L.C.

129

1
vising of his or her recommendations, if any, for
2
congressional action, including but not limited to,
3
amendment of this Act.
4
(2) The United States, as party in the action, shall
5 advise the court and the opposing party or parties in such
6 litigation of any action taken by Congress which might
7 affect such litigation on or before 330 days after entry
8 of the final judgment.
9
(3) Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 2414
10 and 2517 of title 28 of the United States Code, the pay11 ment of any just compensation awarded in litigation de12 scribed in paragraph (1) of this subsection shall be de13 ferred for not more than one year after entry of the final
14 judgment, except that this 1-year limitation on deferral
15 of payment shall not apply if the judgment is reopened
16 as provided in subparagraph (4) (A) of this subsection.
17
(4) (A) In the event that the Congress repeals or
18 modifies, in whole or in part, the terms of the Act found
19 to have effected a taking, and on motion of either the
20 United States or the opposing party or parties in the liti21 gation, the court shall reopen the final judgment to deter22 mine the extent, if any, to which the congressional action
23 affects the finding of any taking, the award of any just
24 compensation, and the award of reasonable fees and ex25 penses to the extent provided by section 304 of the UniOctober 22, 1993 (5:33 p.m.)

H L.C .
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

form Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition
Policies Act of 1970 (42 U.S.C. 4654(c)).
-- -(B) The Congress does not timely repeal or modify,
in whole or in part, the terms of the Act found to have
effected the taking, the just compensation award shall include, when paid, appropriate postjudgment interest for
the period of deferred payment, and appropriate reasonable fees and expenses to the extent provided by section
304 of the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970 (40 U.S.C. 4654(c)).
(c) Effect of Appeal.—The time limitations specified in subsections (a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3), (b)(1)(B), (b)(2),
and (b)(3) of this section shall not apply for any period
during which an appeal of the court’s final judgment is
pending.
(d) Limitations of Actions.—Notwithstanding the
provisions of sections 2401 and 2501 of title 28 of the
United States Code—
(1) any claim alleging a taking by reason of
Federal action implementing this Act shall be forever barred if not brought on or before 2 years after
the date on which the cause of action accrues; and
(2) any claim alleging a taking by reason of the
effects of the terms of this Act itself shall be forever

October 22,1993 (5:33 p.m.)

H.L.C.
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1
2

October 22,1993 (5:33 p.m.)

barred if not brought on or before 2 years after the
effective date of this Act.

